We study the impact of redistributive policies when agents can signal their social status by spending on a conspicuous good. Our focus is on how the shape of the status function -i.e., how social status is computed and evaluated -can affect the equilibrium outcome of the model, and in particular the relationship between inequality and wasteful conspicuous consumption. We find that if status depends in an ordinal way on individuals' relative standing in terms of economic resources, then redistributing resources from the rich to the poor increases social waste because it forces the rich to spend more on conspicuous consumption in order to differentiate themselves from the poor. If, instead, status depends in a cardinal way on individuals' relative standing, then a redistribution of resources in favor of the poor can reduce social waste. This is possible because under cardinal status there is an additional effect: a lesser degree of inequality decreases the value of social status and, hence, reduces the incentives to engage in wasteful social competition. If this second effect is stronger than the first one, then social waste reduces. In this case a Pareto improvement is also possible but it requires, in addition, that the rich save enough on costly signaling to compensate for the losses due to the reduction of economic resources.
Introduction
This paper deals with the evaluation of redistributive policies when agents can signal their relative standing by spending on a conspicuous good. We analyze how the shape of the status function -i.e., how people compute and evaluate their relative standing -may affect the model predictions. We find that the evaluation of redistributive policies is very sensitive to the specification of the status function. This is
something not yet fully recognized by the growing body of literature on public policies under concerns for relativity.
The economic consequences of status have been a subject of economic inquiry since the work of Veblen (1899). However, for a modern formalization based on preferences, we have to wait until the notable book by Duesenberry (1949) . In more recent times the theoretical literature on status has considerably grown. 1 Moreover, substantial empirical evidence has been provided which confirms that people do care about their relative standing in society. 2 Several studies have investigated the consequences of fiscal policies in the presence of status seeking behavior. A first formal analysis is found in Duesenberry (1949) where it is proved that, if individuals care about the ratio between their consumption and a weighted average of others' consumption, then an income tax may be Pareto improving. Subsequently, a number of studies have focused on showing that taxing conspicuous consumption can be welfare enhancing, as it leads to a reduction in a socially wasteful activity (see, e.g., Frank, 1985b; Ng, 1987; Ireland, 1994) . 3 More recently, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004, 2009) show that, in a framework much in the spirit of Frank (1985b) , income equality fosters social competition (for status) and, hence, wasteful consumption. They conclude that more income equality may be detrimental to welfare -especially for middle-class people -though increasing inequality does not generate a Pareto improvement.
We contribute to the economic literature on social status by investigating how the definition of status affects the relationship between inequality and social waste in conspicuous consumption. Our main finding is that the effects of redistributive policies which alter inequality are very sensitive to the specification of the status function. 4 More precisely, we show that while a greater equality in the distribution of economic resources increases social competition under ordinal 5 status (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004, 2009 ) -i.e., when people care only about their rank in the distribution of the status bearing good or asset -exactly the opposite may occur under cardinal status -i.e., when people also care about how far other people are in the relevant distribution. For the latter case, we also identify a necessary and sufficient condition for a redistributive policy to be Pareto improving.
The intuition of our results is the following. Individuals engage in social competition for status by spending on the conspicuous good. Richer individuals find conspicuous consumption subjectively less 1 See, for instance, Akerlof (1997) , Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) , Becker et al. (2005) , Bowles and Park (2005) , Clark and Oswald (1998) , Cole et al. (1992) , Cooper et al. (2001) , Corneo and Jeanne (1997) , Fershtman et al. (1996) , Fershtman and Weiss (1993) , Frank (1985a), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) , Ireland (2001) , Robson (1992) .
2 See Clark et al. (2008) , Layard (2005) , Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002) and Luttmer (2005) for a representative list of references. 3 Other related studies concern the welfare enhancing effect of labor taxation in the presence of conspicuous consumption; see, e.g., Ireland (1998 ), Corneo (2002 , Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) . 4 In the typical economic model, social status is granted by what an individual has -or is believed to haverelatively to what others have in terms of goods or assets considered important by the individual's reference population. 5 In order to avoid confusion, we remark that the terms "ordinal" and "cardinal" are meant to underline which kind of characteristics of the destribution of the status bearing object are taken into account to compute a person's social status. costly because of decreasing marginal utility of inconspicuous consumption. Differentiation from poor individuals is attained by spending enough on conspicuous consumpiton to make such a level of spending unattractive for poor individuals. Under an ordinal notion of status the benefits of being recognized as a rich individual are independent of the distribution of resources, as long as ranks are preserved. Therefore, a lesser degree of inequality generated by a redistribution in favor of the poor always increases social waste because the poor get richer and, hence, the rich are required to spend more on conspicuous consumption in order to differentiate from the poor. Under a cardinal notion of status the situation is more complicated.
The effect described for the case of ordinal status is present but, in addition, there is a further effect: a lesser degree of inequality decreases the difference between the benefits of high status and the benefits of low status. This decreases the incentive to engage in wasteful social competition as the poor would gain less by being recognized as rich individuals and, hence, the rich have to spend less in order to differentiate from the poor. If this second effect is stronger than the first one, then social waste decreases. If the reduction in social waste is large enough to compensate the rich for the loss of resources and the loss of status then everyone is better off.
The consequences of inequality under concerns for social status have been already analyzed by Merzyn (2006) . Like us, Merzyn considers a signaling model where social competition generates wasteful conspicuous consumption. His contribution in this regard is the proof that, if individuals have heterogeneous tastes about the conspicuous good which is used as a wealth signal, then a greater wealth equality may go with a lesser social waste in conspicuous consumption. The mechanism behind the result is the following. Since individuals have both heterogeneous preferences and heterogeneous wealth, there is uncertainty about the reason why an individual buys more conspicuous good than another individual: it may be because she likes it more or because she is wealthier. As a consequence, a greater equality in wealth endowments increases the likelihood that differences in conspicuous consumption are due to different tastes, making conspicuous consumption less informative about one's wealth. Therefore, more equality reduces the prize associated with a given social position, implying that social status is cardinal and that a redistributive policy is potentially waste reducing. Merzyn's paper is important because it is the first to recognize, in contrast with Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) , that a decrease in inequality can lead to a decrease in wasteful signaling.
In fact, Merzyn's result is based on a mechanism -i.e., uncertainty about why an individual conspicuously consumes -which entails a cardinal notion of status. However, Merzyn does not investigate the fundamental role played by the notion of status, remaining silent on the general connection between the notion of status and the link between inequality and social waste. With the present paper we shed light exactly on this point.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses four important issues about the modeling of social status in economic models, explaining our choices in their regard. Section 3 introduces the signaling model employed throughout the paper. Section 4 investigates the consequences of a redistributive policy in favor of the poor, illustrating a necessary and sufficient condition for a marginal redistribution to be waste reducing, as well as a more demanding necessary and sufficient condition for the same policy to be Pareto improving. Section 5 explores the consequences of redistribution in the case where resources spent on conspicuous consumption do not concur to determine social status -although, of course, they remain an informative signal in equilibrium. Section 6 contains a few final comments and conclusions.
A preliminary discussion on social status
Although economists generally agree that social status is relevant to economic behavior, four issues regarding the economic foundations of social status are still object of a lively discussion. In order to allow a better understanding of our model we find convenient to briefly illustrate what positions we take with respect to each issue. This also allows us to clarify in what respects our contribution is relevant and in what it is not.
The first issue is why people give a value to their status. An explanation is that concerns for status are hardwired into human beings (Veblen, 1899) . Indeed, there are reasonable evolutionary arguments supporting the thesis that preferences which give value to one's relative standing grant a higher fitness than preferences which give value only to one's absolute standing. This has been shown to be especially likely in the case of limited cognitive capabilities and uncertain environment (Rayo and Becker, 2007; Samuelson, 2004) . A more sophisticated explanation is that status is instrumental to something else, that is, it is a means to an end Postlewaite, 2003, 2006) . A classical argument in this regard is based on matching models: status may be instrumental to matching with a wealthy mate (Cole et al., 1992 (Cole et al., , 1998 ). In our model we take no sharp position with respect to either explanation (as done, e.g., by Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004) . We assume that people have concerns for status but we do not investigate why it is so.
The second issue is what is the status-bearing object, i.e., the object whose distribution in the population is thought to determine social status. In this regard there exists a variety of positions. One, which comes from the sociological literature, points to the endowment of human capital of which education and occupation may be seen as proxies (Fershtman and Weiss, 1993; Fershtman et al., 1996) . Another idea is that status depends on the current level of income or consumption, the so-called relative income hypothesis (see Clark et al., 2008, and references therein) . An alternative approach posits that social status is determined by the distribution of wealth (e.g., Robson, 1992) . In our model we assume that status is given by the endowment of valuable resources one is believed to own (as in Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996) . Since our model is atemporal, resources can be interpreted as either income, total consumption, or wealth. If a positive correlation between human capital and either income or wealth is assumed, then resources can also be thought of as human capital proxies. Note that we keep resources logically distinct from conspicuous consumption.
While there is a plenty of evidence about individuals engaging in conspicuous consumption, we find it hard to think of conspicuous consumption as conferring status by itself. Although we do not reject the possibility that social status is hardwired into human preferences, we agree with Postlewaite (1998) that it seems at least unlikely that the relation between modern conspicuous goods and social status is also hardwired into human preferences.
The third issue is related to the second one: is the status-bearing object fully observable? This is a relevant issue because, if the status-bearing object is not fully observable, then individuals may engage in potentially wasteful signaling activities (Ireland, 1994 (Ireland, , 2001 Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996; Cole et al., 1995; Corneo and Jeanne, 1998) . In our model we assume that the status-bearing object is not fully observable and that conspicuous consumption is a signal for it. Our argument is quite simple: we find that full observability is a rather extreme assumption for either human capital, income, total consumption or wealth.
The last issue is how one's status depends on the distribution of the status-bearing object -or, more precisely, what characteristics of the distribution determine one's social status. A popular approach is that only position matters: social status is determined by the rank occupied in the relevant distribution (e.g., Frank, 1985a; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004; Ireland, 1994; Corneo and Jeanne, 1997; Becker et al., 2005) .
Alternatively, there exists a variety of status definitions which entail cardinal elements. For instance, in the seminal contribution by Duesenberry (1949) status is determined by the ratio between one's own and average consumption (see also Clark et al., 2008 , and references therein); otherwise, status may depend on the difference between one's own and average value in the relevant distribution (e.g., Cooper et al., 2001; Bowles and Park, 2005) . Importantly, Clark and Oswald (1998) have shown that the choice between these two cardinal options is not innocuous: if people care about the difference between values instead of caring about the ratio between values then they are more likely to show a conformist behavior than a deviant one.
A further proof of the relevance of this issue is provided by Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008) where it is shown that one finding from Clark and Oswald (1998) is not robust to the switch from cardinal to ordinal status and that one finding from Frank (1985b) is not robust to the switch from ordinal to cardinal status. In the present paper we show how crucial is the applied notion of status for the model predictions by proving that the evaluation of a redistributive policy in favor of the poor depends on the definition of status. More precisely, we investigate under which conditions a marginal redistribution of the status-bearing object from the rich to the poor leads to: i) a reduction of the waste in signaling for status, ii) an increase in everybody's utility. We also show that neither i) nor ii) can be obtained under ordinal status.
A signaling model of status
We consider 6 a population of two types of individuals, that we label "rich" and "poor" for simplicity and whose fractions in the population are, respectively, β and (1 − β). 7 Hereafter, the subscript h will be used to refer to the rich (individuals with a high level of resources), while the subscript l will be used to refer to the poor (individuals with a low level of resources). Rich and poor differ only in their endowments of resources that are indicated with R h and R l , with R h > R l and R h , R l ∈ R + . All individuals allocate resources to either the consumption of an inconspicuous good or to the consumption of a conspicuous good. Since in our analysis we will not let prices vary, we set both prices equal to 1 without loss of generality. Inconspicuous consumption is indicated with c while conspicuous consumption is indicated with x. Furthermore, we posit that both the endowments of resources and c are unobservable while x is observable.
Individual utility is assumed to be additive in two components, one measuring the utility from inconspicuous consumption, u, and another measuring the utility from status, s. 8 Note that the conspicuous good does not generate utility directly. We make the usual assumptions about the shape of u(c), namely u > 0 and u < 0. For what concerns status, it is assumed to depend on the relative access to resources. If the amount of resources possessed by each individual were public information then status would be independent of individuals' actions. However, while the overall distribution of resources is public information -i.e., R h , R l and β -the amount of resources possessed by any single individual is a private information. Therefore, in order to attain status individuals have to signal their possession of resources by consuming the conspicuous good x. More precisely, status is gained depending on how the signal x is interpreted, as described by the belief function µ : R + → [0, 1] which gives the probability, conditional on the observation of x, of being considered of type h.
Social status is also assumed to depend on the distribution of resources. However, since in our comparative statics exercise the parameter β is kept constant, we simplify notation by omitting an explicit dependence of the status function upon β. Formally, status is defined to be a differentiable function s(µ(x), R l , R h ), which we also interpret as utility accruing from status. We assume that s is a strictly increasing function of µ(x). For notational convenience, we denote with L the status of poor, that is
and with H the status of rich, that is H(R l , R h ) = s(1, R l , R h ). We omit the dependence on R l and R h when this does not generate ambiguities. In line with intuition we also assume that L l = ∂L/∂R l ≥ 0, 6 Our model has been built with the specific aim of disclosing the important role played by the notion of social status. The particularly simple setup that we have chosen is, in our opinion, the simplest possible that allows us to make a neat point. More complicated models would certainly add some realism and possibly provide additional insights, but they would not substantially affect the point we make in this paper. 7 As long as individuals take others' actions as given and there exists at least one rich and one poor individual, the total number of agents plays no substantial role here. In particular, the population may be assumed either finite or infinite. 8 Additivity is not necessary, though it greatly simplifies the analysis. Moreover, both u and s are maintained general enough to let additive utility represent preferences which are consistent with a variety of functional specifications of utility -obtainable from ours through an appropriate monotone transformation.
In other words, the status associated with being poor is not increasing in the rich's access to resources and is not decreasing in the poor's access to resources.
Symmetrically, the status associated with being rich is not increasing in the poor's access to resources and is not decreasing in the rich's access to resources.
We now distinguish between an ordinal and a cardinal notion of status. If status is ordinal then L h = L l = H h = H l = 0, that is, H and L are constants. If, instead, status is cardinal then the derivatives L h , L l , H h , and H l are not all equal to zero. Indeed, if people care not only about being ahead of (or behind) others but also about how much ahead (or behind) they are, then also R l and R h matter. In particular, we expect L(R l , R h ) to increase in R l and decrease in R h , and H(R l , R h ) to increase in R h and decrease in R l , although we may have that only some of these dependencies are actually in place.
Summing up, the decision problem of the generic individual of type i, with i = h, l, can be described as
Since u > 0, the budget constraint must hold with equality. Hence, (1) can be restated as
Note that the belief function µ can assign any value to out-of-equilibrium signals. This great freedom yields a multiplicity of both pooling and separating equilibria. 9 In order to get a unique prediction for this model, we restrict attention to the so-called Riley equilibrium, which is widely accepted as prominent equilibrium concept in signaling theory (see Riley, 2001) . As a result, we obtain the separating equilibrium where i) the poor spend nothing on signaling (as in all separating equilibria), and ii) the rich spend on signaling the minimum amount which makes a deviation not strictly convenient for the poor. This is illustrated in figure 1 . Formally, in the refined equilibrium the following condition must hold, where we simplify notation by letting x * = x * h :
Condition (3) characterizes the equilibrium that we use as a reference point in our comparative statics exercise about redistribution of resources.
Redistribution when social status depends on transferable resources
We employ the model of the previous section to analyze the effects of redistributive policies in favor of the poor. Before entering this issue we make a couple of remarks. First, in order for a redistribution of resources to be considered, resources must be transferable. So far we have been vague about resources, in order not to rely on specific assumptions when unnecessary. However, not every conceivable interpretation for resources is compatible with transferability. If, for instance, by resources we refer to time endowments then this requirement looks as particularly demanding. On the contrary, if we refer to monetary wealth then the requirement seems rather plausible. Therefore, in what follows we restrict the analysis to resources which are transferable. Second, although the general working of the redistributive policy is public information, we assume that individuals can only observe their own transfers. In fact, if all transfers were observable then poor and rich people would be automatically identified and there would be no necessity of signaling.
In the following we consider balanced-budget redistributions, that are transfers ∆R l and ∆R h satisfying the following condition:
from which ∆R h /∆R l = −(1 − β)/β. For notational convenience we define α = (1 − β)/β. Furthermore, and again to simplify notation, we indicate with L r and H r the marginal effect of a redistribution in favor of the poor on the status of poor and the status of rich, respectively. Namely, L r = L l − αL h and H r = H l − αH h .
Note that L r ≥ 0 and H r ≤ 0.
Intuitively, a redistributive policy affects the incentive to spend on signaling by changing the marginal opportunity cost of signaling. In particular, because of the concavity of the utility function u, if the poor become richer then their marginal opportunity cost of signaling decreases. As a consequence, the poor are willing to spend more on signaling and the rich are hence forced to waste more to differentiate themselves from the poor. However, this effect -which we may refer to as "increased social competitiveness" 10 -is not the only one: if status is cardinal then the value of being considered rich relatively to being considered poor decreases when the rich become poorer and the poor become richer. This effect -which we may refer to as "decreased prize for competition" -reduces the amount of resources that the poor are willing to waste in signaling and, hence, it makes the rich save on signaling. Proposition 1 identifies under what conditions on u, s, R l and R h we have that the second effect dominates.
Proposition 1. A marginal redistribution in favor of the poor reduces the total waste in signaling if and only if the following condition holds:
Proof. The condition is immediately obtained by differentiating (3) in the light of (4).
Condition (5) has a straightforward interpretation. The left-hand side represents the change in the status prize due to the joint increase in R l and decrease in R h . In particular, the prize changes as the result of two effects: the reduction of the desirability of being rich, H r , and the reduction of the undesirability of being poor, L r . The right-hand side represents the change in the opportunity cost for the poor to engage in social competition. Hence, redistributing in favor of the poor reduces social waste as long as it reduces the status prize more than it decreases the opportunity cost of the poor to engage in social competition.
As regards welfare, we see that a redistribution in favor of the poor raises their utility because their consumption of the useful good increases (in fact, in equilibrium they always spend zero on signaling) and, if status is cardinal, the value of being considered poor can increase as well. On the contrary, the waste in signaling being equal, a redistribution makes the rich worse off because it reduces their consumption of the useful good. Moreover, if status is cardinal the value of being considered rich can decrease too as a consequence of the redistributive policy. This means that rich individuals may well find themselves worse off after the redistribution, notwithstanding the fact that social waste is decreased. However, if the net effect of increased social competitiveness and decreased prize for competition allows the rich to save a large enough amount of resources, then their consumption of the inconspicuous good can actually increase. If such an increase is large enough to compensate for the loss of status, then the redistributive policy leads to 
Proof. We take the derivative of the equilibrium utility of the poor by exploiting the left-hand side of (3) and (4):
Since u (R l ) > 0 and L r ≥ 0, we conclude that the derivative of the equilibrium utility of the poor with respect to a redistribution in their favor is always positive. Furthermore, differentiating the utility of the rich in the light of (4) and taking into account the fact that x * depends on both R l and R h , we obtain:
(8) Since the poor are surely better off, a redistribution yields a Pareto improvement if and only if (8) is larger than zero, that is precisely (6).
Condition (6) can be interpreted as follows. The right-hand side represents the total reduction of the utility of rich individuals due to redistribution. More precisely, the first term represents the reduction of utility due to the loss of resources while the second term represents the reduction of utility due to the loss of status. The left-hand side represents the change in utility due to the change in the amount of signaling.
In the light of this we see that, for a Pareto improvement to be feasible, the reduction in signaling must be substantially greater than the amount of resources which are redistributed. In addition, a Pareto improvement requires that the status prize is rather sensitive to inequality and, at the same time, that the status of rich is not very sensitive to inequality -meaning that it must be the status of poor to be rather sensitive to inequality as, for instance, in the case of relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966) . These considerations suggests that a Pareto improvement might be hard to attain.
The analysis presented in this section appears to be in contrast with the results provided by Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) . Actually, this is entirely due to the fact that we do not restrict the analysis to ordinal status. The following corollary formalizes what happens under ordinal status, which is consistent with Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) . Proof. If status is ordinal then L r = H r = 0. By evaluating (5) and (8) when L r = H r = 0, we obtain that a marginal redistribution increases the waste in signaling and decreases the rich's utility. Since this is true for every R l and R h , then any redistributive policy yields the same results and we obtain (a) and (b).
Redistribution when social status depends on resources not spent in signaling
In section 4 we intentionally did not specify a particular interpretation for resources, as our aim is to tackle the issue by looking for a common denominator across different specifications of status. However, the implicit assumption that status is not affected by the amount wasted in signaling contrasts with one of the most natural interpretation of resources, namely disposable income. In the following we try to briefly extend our model along this direction.
We assume that utility from status accrues to an individual depending upon how large her disposable income is believed to be. More precisely, an individual who is observed to waste x in signaling is assigned probability µ(x) to have R h − x disposable resources and probability 1 − µ(x) to have R l − x disposable resources. Status is hence representable as a function s(µ(x), R l − x, R h − x), and the definitions of the status of poor and the status of rich are modified accordingly,
This version of the model still configures as a standard signaling model, as long as x remains a costly activity in the absence of changes in beliefs. Therefore, we assume that for any signal x, for any b ∈ [0, 1],
/∂x] measures the change in status due to an increase in x of an individual who is believed with probability b to possess R h − x resources and with probability 1 − b to possess R l − x disposable resources. If it is negative then the previous assumption is clearly satisfied. We allow the change in status due to an increase in x to be positive, but not larger than u (R i − x) in absolute value. Figure 2 may help to understand how the basic model has changed. Equilibrium condition (3) is turned into the following:
We denote with H x the derivative of the status of rich with respect to the expenditure in signaling, hence H x = −(H l + H h ). As in section 4, we first look at a marginal redistribution which diminishes wasteful signaling.
Proposition 3. If social status depends on disposable resources, then a marginal redistribution in favor of the poor reduces the total waste in signaling if and only if the following condition holds:
Proof. Differentiating (9) in the light of (4) we get:
from which condition (10) is easily obtained, once we recognize that the denominator is positive since x is assumed to be a costly activity. In the case where social status depends on disposable resources reduction in social waste directly affects the value of the status of rich of an amount equal to H x dx * . This provides an additional source of variation for the status prize that affects the size of the change in social waste which is induced by a marginal redistribution, as we understand by looking at (11). Everything else being equal, a status function such that the status of rich increases more (or decreases less) as the result of a greater spending on conspicuous consumption enhances the effects on social waste induced by a marginal redistribution.
Finally, we look at the possibility to obtain a Pareto improvement by providing the counterpart of Proposition (2) in the current setting.
Proposition 4. If social status depends on disposable resources, then a marginal redistribution in favor of the poor induces a Pareto improvement if and only if the following condition holds:
Proof. Since the poor choose x l = 0 in equilibrium, the first part of the proof is as in Proposition (2).
Differentiating the utility of the rich in the light of (4) we obtain:
(13) We get condition (12) by imposing that (13) is greater than zero, in the light of (11).
Condition (12) can be interpreted similarly to condition (6). However, a few differences arise not only because the status of rich and the status of poor have different arguments -disposable resources in one case and total amount of resources in the other case -but also because the term H x appears twice in (12). First, it affects the size of the induced change in x * , as discussed above. Second, it affects the impact that a given change in x * has on the utility of the rich. In particular, if we suppose to be in a case where a marginal redistribution reduces social waste, then, everything else being equal, we have that a greater H x makes the rich both save more on cospicuous consumption and lose more in terms of social status.
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied how the notion of social status influences the link between inequality and wasteful social competition. To this aim we have developed a simple model where agents use conspicuous consumption to signal their social status, which in turn depends on the relative possession of resources which are spendable in the market. As pointed out by Hopkins and Kornienko (2004, 2009 ), a greater income equality enhances social competitiveness by making it simpler to outperform other individuals in terms of conspicuous consumption. We proved that if status is ordinal, then the effect emphasized by Hopkins and Kornienko necessarily leads to a greater amount of inefficient signaling and a loss of welfare for high status individuals. However, if status is cardinal, then a redistribution in favor of the poor can actually induce a smaller amount of wasteful signaling. Indeed, when status is cardinal a greater equality has a further effect: the prize of the competition for status gets smaller and, as a consequence, people have less incentive to engage in wasteful social competition. We have also shown that, if this additional effect is particularly strong, then it is possible that the reduction in social waste is large enough to compensate high status individuals for both the loss of resources and the loss of status. We have made these claims precise by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for a marginal redistribution in favor of the poor to reduce the waste in signaling and to be strictly Pareto improving. Then, we have explored the robustness of these findings in a natural variant of the model: the case where social status depends on the amount of resources not wasted in signaling. Although some differences actually arise, we have found that the quality of our results still holds.
We think that our contribution is relevant under three different respects. In the first place, it helps to correctly interpret the findings of Hopkins and Kornienko (2004, 2009) about the relationship between income equality and competition for status. While Hopkins and Kornienko are very precise in stating that their results do not imply that more equality (or a redistribution in favor of the poor) is necessarily undesirable, they do stress the fact that in order to reduce inequality we must accept, ceteris paribus, a greater waste in conspicuous consumption. We have shown that such a cost of reducing inequality is not guaranteed in general but arises when social status is not very reactive to differences in the possession of resources. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, by itself the presence of status concerns does not make a redistributive policy less desirable. Second, the desirability of a redistributive policy as a means to reduce the waste in signaling can be evaluated only if we have good information about how social status is defined.
In the second place, our results show that the definition of social status can make a great difference for the model predictions. Indeed, in the case dealt with in this paper we have that, depending on what is considered relevant for the determination of people's relative standing in society, a policy can worsen the inefficiencies due to status seeking behavior or be a good corrective for them. In our opinion this finding greatly reinforces the message conveyed by Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008) : in models where people are assumed to be concerned with social status, the applied definition of status should be carefully discussed and motivated. This fact is not yet fully recognized by the literature on inequality and relativity. While some examples have been provided in which the relationship between inequality and happiness does not depend on status ordinality or cardinality (e.g., Hopkins, 2008) , the present paper proves that this is not a general finding, at least when status is signaled through conspicuous consumption.
In the third place, our analysis casts a new light on the recent study by Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) about the inequality of "endowments" and "rewards". Translating Hopkins and Kornienko's language in our setting we can say that "endowments" are what determines the attainment of status in the social competition -i.e., the status-bearing asset -while rewards are the prizes obtained according to status attainments -i.e., the value of social status. Our paper highlights that the distribution of endowments and the distribution of rewards need not be independent. In particular, we may have the distribution of rewards depending on the distribution of endowments. This seems particularly the case if, as suggested by Postlewaite (1998), we adopt an instrumental approach to social status -e.g., status is valued because grants a good mate whose value, in turn, depends on the endowments possessed.
One further remark on the nature of our findings is worth making. Although our conclusions are quite robust with reference to the implications of status concerns for the evaluation of redistributive policies, they are definitely not robust with reference to the evaluation of redistributive policies in general. In fact, we have abstracted from many features of real world economies which play an important role in determining the effects of redistributive policies (e.g., production is absent, there are only two goods, transfers are made at no cost, prices are exogenous, etc.). Our contribution to the general debate about redistributive policies is to have shown that a policy-maker who wants to correctly judge this kind of policies has to take into account that any change in the distribution of resources possessed by individuals can affect their social status and, hence, their incentive to waste resources in conspicuous consumption.
We conclude by discussing possible lines of future research. A straightforward follow up of the present study is to review models incorporating concerns for status that focus on issues other than redistributive policies and to test their predictions with respect to different specifications of the status function. Another line of research addresses the question of which notion of status best represents people's concerns for relative standing. We think that two routes may be followed in the attempt to answer such question. One is inspired by Postlewaite (1998), and it looks for an instrumentalization -i.e., deriving the shape of the status function from the characteristics of the prizes for the social competition. The other route looks for an empirical answer, though we are aware that the empirical investigation of social constructs may encounter substantial technical and methodological difficulties. To the best of our knowledge, so far there have been only two attempts to test the appropriateness of competing notions of status. The first is by Brown et al. (2005) and provides supportive evidence of the so-called Range-Frequency Theory (RFT) (Parducci, 1965 (Parducci, , 1995 . RFT states that people care about two things only: their rank in the relevant distribution and the support of the relevant distribution. We emphasize that RFT entails cardinal status (in terms of our model we have that H i 0, L i 0, i = h, l). The other study is Clark et al. (2010) which finds that, with respect to the relevant income distribution, income rank is a better predictor of work effort than average income.
This suggests that an ordinal specification of status is more adequate than a cardinal specification which considers only deviations from the mean. We think that the next step in this research direction should be to test an ordinal specification of the status function against several cardinal ones in order to identify which features of the relevant distribution play a significant role.
